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 Most of us understand that what we do on the Internet 
is not completely private.  How could it be?  We ask large 
companies to manage our email, we download directions from 
smartphones that can pinpoint our GPS coordinates, and we 
look for information online by typing our queries into search 
engines.  We recognize, even if only intuitively, that our data 
has to be going somewhere.  And indeed it does, feeding an 
entire system of trackers, cookies, and algorithms designed to 
capture and monetize the information we generate.  Most of 
the time, we never think about this.  We browse the Internet, 
and the data-collecting infrastructure of the digital world 
hums along quietly in the background.   
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 Even so, not everything about our online behavior is 
necessarily public.  Numerous federal and state laws prohibit 
certain kinds of disclosures, and private companies often 
promise to protect their customers’ privacy in ways that may 
be enforceable in court.  One of our decisions last year, In re 
Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation,1 
addressed many of these issues.  This case addresses still 
more.   
 This is a multidistrict consolidated class action.  The 
plaintiffs are children younger than 13 who allege that the 
defendants, Viacom and Google, unlawfully collected 
personal information about them on the Internet, including 
what webpages they visited and what videos they watched on 
Viacom’s websites.  Many of the plaintiffs’ claims overlap 
substantially with those we addressed in Google, and indeed 
fail for similar reasons.  Even so, two of the plaintiffs’ 
claims—one for violation of the federal Video Privacy 
Protection Act, and one for invasion of privacy under New 
Jersey law—raise questions of first impression in our Circuit.   
 The Video Privacy Protection Act, passed by Congress 
in 1988, prohibits the disclosure of personally identifying 
information relating to viewers’ consumption of video-related 
services.  Interpreting the Act for the first time, we hold that 
the law permits plaintiffs to sue only a person who discloses 
such information, not a person who receives such information.  
We also hold that the Act’s prohibition on the disclosure of 
personally identifiable information applies only to the kind of 
information that would readily permit an ordinary person to 
identify a specific individual’s video-watching behavior.  In 
                                                 
1 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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our view, the kinds of disclosures at issue here, involving 
digital identifiers like IP addresses, fall outside the Act’s 
protections. 
 The plaintiffs also claim that Viacom and Google 
invaded their privacy by committing the tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion.  That claim arises from allegations that Viacom 
explicitly promised not to collect any personal information 
about children who browsed its websites and then, despite its 
assurances, did exactly that.  We faced a similar allegation of 
deceitful conduct in Google, where we vacated the dismissal 
of state-law claims for invasion of privacy and remanded 
them for further proceedings.  We reach a similar result here, 
concluding that, at least as to Viacom, the plaintiffs have 
adequately alleged a claim for intrusion upon seclusion.  In so 
doing, we hold that the 1998 Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act, a federal statute that empowers the Federal 
Trade Commission to regulate websites that target children, 
does not preempt the plaintiffs’ state-law privacy claim.  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of most of the plaintiffs’ claims, vacate its dismissal 
of the claim for intrusion upon seclusion against Viacom, and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
 We begin by summarizing the allegations in the 
plaintiffs’ complaints.2   
                                                 
2 The plaintiffs filed a Master Consolidated Class Action 
Complaint that included seven claims.  (See App. Vol. II at 
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A. Internet Cookie Technology  
 When a person uses a web browser to access a website, 
the browser sends a “GET” request to the server hosting that 
site.  So, for example, if a person types “www.nick.com” into 
the address bar of his or her web browser, the browser 
contacts the server where Nick.com is hosted and transmits 
data back to the user’s computer.3  In addition to other 
content, Nick.com may also display ads from third parties.  
These ads typically reside on a different server.  To display 
the ad, the Nick.com server will direct the user’s browser to 
send another “GET” request to the third-party server, which 
will then transmit the ad directly to the user’s computer.  
From the user’s perspective, all of this appears to happen 
simultaneously, and all the visual information on Nick.com 
appears to originate from a single source.  In reality, the 
Nick.com website is an assemblage of content from multiple 
                                                                                                             
 
59–107.)  The District Court dismissed four claims with 
prejudice, two claims without prejudice as to both defendants, 
and one claim with prejudice as to Google but without 
prejudice as to Viacom.  The plaintiffs then filed a Second 
Consolidated Class Action Complaint.  (See id. at 108–62.)  
The two complaints are cited throughout as the “First Compl.” 
and “Second Compl.”  As this is “an appeal from a Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal, we must accept all well-pled allegations in 
the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party.”  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 
464 F.3d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2006). 
3 Second Compl. ¶¶ 25–26. 
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servers hosted by different parties.4    
 An Internet “cookie” is a small text file that a web 
server places on a user’s computing device.5  Cookies allow a 
website to “remember” information about a user’s browsing 
activities (such as whether or not the user is logged-in, or 
what specific pages the user has visited).  We can distinguish 
between first-party cookies, which are injected into a user’s 
computer by a website that the user chooses to visit (e.g., 
Nick.com), and third-party cookies, which are placed on a 
user’s computer by a server other than the one that a person 
intends to visit (e.g., by an ad company like Google).6   
 Advertising companies use third-party cookies to help 
them target advertisements more effectively at customers who 
might be interested in buying a particular product.  Cookies 
are particularly powerful if the same company hosts ads on 
more than one website.  In those circumstances, advertising 
companies are able to follow a user’s browsing habits across 
multiple websites that host the company’s ads.  Given 
Google’s dominance in the Internet advertising market, the 
plaintiffs claim that Google is able to use cookies to track 
users’ behavior across large swaths of the Internet.7 
                                                 
4 Id. ¶¶ 27–29. 
5 Id. ¶ 31. 
6 Id. ¶ 33. 
7 Id. ¶ 45. 
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B. Factual Allegations 
 Defendant Viacom owns the children’s television 
station Nickelodeon.  It also operates Nick.com, a website 
geared towards children that offers streaming videos and 
interactive games.8  A child registers to use Nick.com by 
signing up for an account and choosing a username and 
password.9  During the registration process, a child provides 
his or her birthdate and gender to Viacom, and Viacom then 
assigns the child a code based on that information.10  The 
plaintiffs also assert that Viacom’s registration form includes 
a message to children’s parents:  “HEY GROWN-UPS:  We 
don’t collect ANY personal information about your kids.  
Which means we couldn’t share it even if we wanted to!”11   
 The plaintiffs allege that Viacom and Google 
unlawfully used cookies to track children’s web browsing and 
video-watching habits on Viacom’s websites.  They claim that 
                                                 
8 Id. ¶¶ 1, 101, 109.  The plaintiffs’ first complaint also 
raised allegations relating to NickJr.com and NeoPets.com, 
but those websites do not appear in the plaintiffs’ second 
complaint.  See First Compl. ¶¶ 1, 126. 
9 Second Compl. ¶¶ 102–03. 
10 Viacom apparently refers to these as “rugrat codes,” with 
the moniker “rugrat” coming from the long-running 
Nickelodeon cartoon of the same name.  So, for example, the 
“rugrat code” for all six-year-old boys registered to use 
Viacom’s websites is “Dil,” the name of one of the Rugrats 
characters.  Id. ¶¶ 104, 111–12.   
11 Id. ¶ 103.   
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the defendants collected information about children in at least 
four ways. 
 First, when a user visits one of Viacom’s websites, 
Viacom places its own first-party cookie on that user’s 
computer.12  This permits Viacom to track a child’s behavior, 
including which games a child plays and which videos a child 
watches.   
 Second, Google contracts with Viacom to place 
advertisements on Viacom’s websites.  As a result, Google is 
able to place third-party cookies on the computers of persons 
who visit those websites, including children.13   
 Third, the plaintiffs claim that, “[u]pon information 
and belief, Viacom also provided Google with access to the 
profile and other information contained within Viacom’s first-
party cookies.”14     
 Fourth, the plaintiffs assert that, once Google places a 
cookie on a person’s computer, it can track that person across 
any website on which Google displays ads.15  Google uses so-
called “Doubleclick.net cookies” to accomplish this task.16  In 
addition, Google offers its own collection of online services 
                                                 
12 Id. ¶ 67.   
13 Id. ¶ 68.  
14 Id. ¶ 70.   
15 Id. ¶¶ 79–87. 
16 Id. ¶ 78. 
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to Google account-holders and other web users, including 
Gmail, Google Maps, and YouTube (which Google owns).17  
The plaintiffs claim that Google combines information that it 
collects from people using its websites with information it 
gleans from displaying ads on others’ websites.18  They also 
claim that “Viacom is aware of Google’s ubiquitous presence 
on the Internet and its tracking of users.”19 
 In the aggregate, the plaintiffs claim that Viacom 
discloses to Google, and Google collects and tracks, all of the 
following information about children who visit Viacom’s 
websites:   
(1) the child’s username/alias; (2) the child’s 
gender; (3) the child’s birthdate; (4) the child’s 
IP address; (5) the child’s browser settings; (6) 
the child’s unique device identifier; (7) the 
child’s operating system; (8) the child’s screen 
resolution; (9) the child’s browser version; (10) 
the child’s web communications, including but 
not limited to detailed URL requests and video 
materials requested and obtained from 
                                                 
17 Id. ¶ 80.   
18 Id. ¶¶ 64, 83; see also First Compl. ¶ 155 (“Upon 
information and belief, in addition to intercepting the 
Plaintiffs’ communications with the Viacom children’s 
websites, Google used the cookies to track the Plaintiffs’ 
communications with other websites on which Google places 
advertisements and related tracking cookies . . . .”).   
19 Second Compl. ¶ 93. 
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Viacom’s children’s websites; and (11) the 
DoubleClick persistent cookie identifiers.20 
 The purpose of all of this information gathering is to 
sell targeted advertising based on users’ web browsing.  In 
fact, the plaintiffs claim that targeting advertisements to 
children is more profitable than targeting advertising to adults 
“because children are generally unable to distinguish between 
content and advertisements.”21  They cite a Wall Street 
Journal article stating that “popular children’s websites install 
more tracking technologies on personal computers than do the 
top websites aimed at adults.”22 
 The plaintiffs also allege a number of facts about 
online tracking more generally.  They claim that it is 
surprisingly easy for advertising companies to identify web 
users’ offline identities based on their online browsing habits.  
They cite a Stanford professor, Arvind Narayanan, for the 
proposition that “re-identification” of web users based on 
seemingly anonymous data is possible based on users’ 
commercial transactions, web browsing, search histories, and 
other factors.23  The plaintiffs also claim that companies can 
use “browser fingerprinting” to identify website visitors based 
on the configuration of a user’s browser and operating 
                                                 
20 Id. ¶ 76. 
21 Id. ¶ 55.   
22 Id. ¶ 56 (quoting Steve Stecklow, On the Web, Children 
Face Intensive Tracking, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 2010).  
23 Id. ¶¶ 57–58. 
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system.24  Using these techniques, the plaintiffs claim that 
Google and Viacom “are able to link online and offline 
activity and identify specific users, including the Plaintiffs 
and children that form the putative class.”25   
 Lastly, the plaintiffs allege a number of facts in order 
to demonstrate that the defendants’ behavior violated 
contemporary social norms.  To that end, they claim that 
Google is a member of an organization called the Interactive 
Advertising Bureau that promulgates a Code of Conduct for 
its members.  That Code is said to prohibit members from 
collecting “personal information” from children “they have 
actual knowledge are under the age of 13.”26  The plaintiffs 
also cite a survey of more than 2,000 adults conducted by the 
Center for Digital Democracy.  According to the survey, 
80 percent of respondents oppose the tracking of children 
even where an advertiser does not “know a child’s name and 
address,” and 91 percent believe advertisers should receive a 
parent’s permission before placing tracking software on a 
minor child’s computing device.27 
C. Procedural History in the District Court  
 In June of 2013, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation transferred six privacy-related suits against Viacom 
                                                 
24 Id. ¶¶ 61–62. 
25 Id. ¶ 64.   
26 Id. ¶ 137(b).   
27 Id. ¶ 164(c), (d).   
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and Google to the District of New Jersey for consolidation.28  
The plaintiffs in these cases seek to represent two classes.  
The first is a class of “[a]ll children under the age of 13 in the 
United States who visited the website Nick.com and had 
Internet cookies that tracked their communications placed on 
their computing devices by Viacom and Google.”29  The 
second is a class of “[a]ll children under the age of 13 in the 
United States who were registered users of Nick.com and who 
engaged with one or more video materials on such site, and 
who had their video viewing histories knowingly disclosed by 
Viacom to Google.”30  The proposed classes are not bounded 
by any time period, although the plaintiffs do note that 
Viacom “revamped its Nick.com website” in August of 2014 
so that it “no longer discloses the particular video viewing or 
game histories of individual users of Nick.com to Google.”31  
 Shortly after transfer to the District of New Jersey, the 
plaintiffs filed their first consolidated complaint.  It raised six 
                                                 
28 In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 949 F. Supp. 
2d 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2013).  
29 Second Compl. ¶ 115.   
30 Id.  
31 Id. ¶ 101.  
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claims, including violations of (i) the Wiretap Act,32 (ii) the 
Stored Communications Act,33 (iii) the California Invasion of 
Privacy Act,34 (iv) the Video Privacy Protection Act,35 (v) the 
New Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act,36 and (vi) a 
claim under New Jersey common law for intrusion upon 
seclusion.  
 The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss all of the plaintiffs’ claims, three of them with 
                                                 
32 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.  The Wiretap Act, “formally 
known as the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act,” was technically superseded by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act in 1986.  Fraser v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2003), as 
amended (Jan. 20, 2004).  We refer to the Wiretap Act 
throughout, as we did in Google. 
33 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. 
34 Cal. Penal Code § 630, et seq.   
35 18 U.S.C. § 2710. 
36 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:38A–3.  The plaintiffs’ first 
complaint also included a count alleging unjust enrichment.  
(See First Compl. ¶¶ 198–201.)  The District Court dismissed 
this claim with prejudice.  (See App. Vol. I at 43–44.)  The 
plaintiffs eventually explained that they sought to use unjust 
enrichment “not as an independent action in tort, but as a 
measure of damages under the [New Jersey Computer Related 
Offenses Act] in a quasi-contractual sense.”  (Pls. Br. at 47.) 
18 
 
prejudice.37  The District Court nonetheless permitted the 
plaintiffs to file an amended complaint revising their claims 
under the Video Privacy Protection Act, the New Jersey 
Computer Related Offenses Act, and for intrusion upon 
seclusion.  The plaintiffs did so, the defendants again moved 
to dismiss, and the District Court dismissed the case in its 
entirety.38  The plaintiffs now appeal.39 
 Our Court’s review of a decision dismissing a 
                                                 
37 In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 12-cv-
7829 (SRC), 2014 WL 3012873, at *20 (D.N.J. July 2, 2014) 
(“Nickelodeon I”).  The District Court dismissed the unjust 
enrichment claim with prejudice, but, as explained earlier, 
that was never a standalone cause of action.  It also dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ Video Privacy Protection Act claims against 
Google with prejudice, but allowed the plaintiffs to amend 
their Video Privacy claim against Viacom.  Id. 
38 In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 12-cv-
7829 (SRC), 2015 WL 248334, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2015) 
(“Nickelodeon II”).  
39 This is a diversity suit brought by plaintiffs under the 
Class Action Fairness Act and various provisions of federal 
law.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1331.  The District Court 
exercised supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law 
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  The District Court entered an 
order dismissing the case on January 20, 2015, and the 
plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.  (App. Vol. I at 1, 
58.)  This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the final order 
of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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complaint is plenary.40 
II. Arguments and Claims Foreclosed by Our 
Decision in Google  
 Google came down in November of 2015, several 
months after briefing in this case was complete but before 
oral argument.  We therefore asked the parties to submit their 
views about Google’s effect on the present litigation.  As will 
become clear, we conclude that Google is fatal to several of 
the plaintiffs’ claims.  
 The Google plaintiffs consisted of a class of persons 
who used two web browsers:  Apple’s Safari and Microsoft’s 
Internet Explorer.41  These browsers came with cookie-
blocking options designed to protect users’ privacy while they 
browsed the Internet.  In February of 2012, a Stanford 
graduate student revealed that Google and several other 
advertising companies had devised ways to evade these 
cookie-blocking options, even while touting publicly that they 
respected their users’ choices about whether to take advantage 
of cookie-blocking technology.42      
 The Google plaintiffs then filed a federal lawsuit 
alleging violations of the Wiretap Act, the Stored 
Communications Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
                                                 
40 Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 192 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
41 Google, 806 F.3d at 133. 
42 Id. at 132.   
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Act.43  They also brought claims for violation of the 
California Invasion of Privacy Act and for intrusion upon 
seclusion and invasion of privacy under California law.44   
 The district court dismissed those claims in their 
entirety.45  We affirmed the dismissals of all claims except 
those for invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion.  
With respect to those claims, we determined that “[a] 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the means by which 
defendants allegedly accomplished their tracking, i.e., by way 
of a deceitful override of the plaintiffs’ cookie blockers, 
marks the serious invasion of privacy contemplated by 
California law.”46 
 With this background in mind, we turn to Google’s 
effect on the present litigation.   
A. Article III Standing  
 “To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate ‘(1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a sufficient causal 
                                                 
43 Id. at 133. 
44 The Google plaintiffs brought other statutory claims not 
relevant to this case, including claims for alleged violations of 
California’s Unfair Competition Law, its Comprehensive 
Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, and its Consumers 
Legal Remedies Act.  See id. 
45 See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer 
Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Del. 2013). 
46 Google, 806 F.3d at 153. 
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connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, 
and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.’”47  To allege an injury-in-fact, “a plaintiff 
must claim ‘the invasion of a concrete and particularized 
legally protected interest’ resulting in harm ‘that is actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”48  A harm is 
“particularized” if it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way.”49  It is “concrete” if it is “‘de facto’; that is, 
it must actually exist” rather than being only “abstract.”50 
 The defendants assert that Article III standing is 
lacking in this case because the disclosure of information 
about the plaintiffs’ online activities does not qualify as an 
injury-in-fact.  Google rejected a similar argument, stating 
that, when it comes to laws that protect privacy, a focus on 
“economic loss is misplaced.”51  Instead, in some cases an 
injury-in-fact “may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating 
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”52  
                                                 
47 Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 193 (quoting Neale v. Volvo Cars 
of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 358–59 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal 
quotation marks omitted and punctuation modified)). 
48 Id. (quoting Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 
247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
49 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 
(1992). 
50 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). 
51 Google, 806 F.3d at 134. 
52 Id. (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 
363, 373 (1982)). 
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Applying this principle, other courts have found standing in 
cases arising from allegedly unlawful disclosures similar to 
those at issue here.53   
 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins54 does not alter our prior analysis in Google.  The 
plaintiff there alleged that Spokeo, an online background 
check company, reported inaccurate information about him to 
its customers.  The plaintiff then sued Spokeo under the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
plaintiff’s “personal interests in the handling of his credit 
information,” coupled with the purported “violations of 
statutory rights created by the [Act],” were sufficient to 
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing.55  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Spokeo to address the 
question of “[w]hether Congress may confer Article III 
standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and 
who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 
F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2014) (“By alleging that Redbox 
disclosed their personal information in violation of the [Video 
Privacy Protection Act], [plaintiffs] have met their burden of 
demonstrating that they suffered an injury in fact that success 
in this suit would redress.”).   
54 136 S. Ct. 1540. 
55 See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 
(9th Cir. 2014).   
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a bare violation of a federal statute.”56  Rather than answer 
that question directly, the Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for 
further proceedings.   
 In doing so, the Supreme Court explained that the 
Ninth Circuit erred in its standing analysis by focusing only 
on whether the plaintiff’s purported injury was 
“particularized” without also assessing whether it was 
sufficiently “concrete.”57  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court noted that even certain kinds of “intangible” harms can 
be “concrete” for purposes of Article III.  When evaluating 
whether such a harm qualifies as an injury-in-fact, judges 
should consider whether the purported injury “has a close 
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as 
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American 
courts.”58  Congress’s judgment on such matters is “also 
instructive and important,” meaning that Congress may 
“elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, 
de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”59   
                                                 
56 Supreme Court, No. 13-1339, Question Presented, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/13-01339qp.pdf (last visited 
June 14, 2016). 
57 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (“Because the Ninth Circuit 
failed to fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness 
and particularization, its standing analysis was incomplete.”).   
58 Id. at 1549.   
59 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 578). 
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 Intangible harms that may give rise to standing also 
include harms that “may be difficult to prove or measure,” 
such as unlawful denial of access to information subject to 
disclosure.60  What a plaintiff cannot do, according to the 
Court, is treat a “bare procedural violation . . . [that] may 
result in no harm” as an Article III injury-in-fact.61  The Court 
provided two examples, including a defendant’s failure to 
comply with a statutory notice requirement and, in the context 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the dissemination of 
inaccurate information about a plaintiff, such as an incorrect 
zip code, that does not “cause harm or present any material 
risk of harm.”62 
 None of these pronouncements calls into question 
whether the plaintiffs in this case have Article III standing.  
The purported injury here is clearly particularized, as each 
plaintiff complains about the disclosure of information 
relating to his or her online behavior.  While perhaps 
“intangible,” the harm is also concrete in the sense that it 
involves a clear de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful disclosure of 
legally protected information.  Insofar as Spokeo directs us to 
consider whether an alleged injury-in-fact “has traditionally 
been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit,”63 Google 
noted that Congress has long provided plaintiffs with the right 
                                                 
60 Id. at 1549–50 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 
U.S. 11 (1998), and Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 
440 (1989)). 
61 Id. at 1550.   
62 Id.   
63 Id. at 1549.   
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to seek redress for unauthorized disclosures of information 
that, in Congress’s judgment, ought to remain private.64 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs have 
alleged facts which, if true, are sufficient to establish 
Article III standing.   
B. The Federal Wiretap Act  
 The plaintiffs bring a claim against both Viacom and 
Google under the federal Wiretap Act.  A plaintiff pleads a 
prima facie case under the Wiretap Act by showing that the 
defendant “(1) intentionally (2) intercepted, endeavored to 
intercept or procured another person to intercept or endeavor 
to intercept (3) the contents of (4) an electronic 
communication, (5) using a device.”65 
 The District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ wiretapping 
claim for two reasons.  First, it concluded that Google’s 
conduct was not unlawful in view of how Google allegedly 
communicated with the plaintiffs’ computers.  The Wiretap 
Act does not make it unlawful “for a person to 
‘intercept . . . electronic communication’ if the person ‘is [1] a 
party to the communication or [2] where one of the parties to 
the communication has given prior consent to such 
                                                 
64 See Google, 806 F.3d at 134 & n.19 (citing Doe v. Chao, 
540 U.S. 614, 641 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(discussing standing under the Privacy Act of 1974)).   
65 Id. at 135 (quoting In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 
329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
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interception . . . .’”66  Here, Google was either a party to all 
communications with the plaintiffs’ computers or was 
permitted to communicate with the plaintiffs’ computers by 
Viacom, who was itself a party to all such communications.  
Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to state a legally sufficient 
wiretapping claim.   
 Second, the District Court concluded that the 
information Google allegedly intercepted was not of the kind 
protected by the statute.  The Wiretap Act prohibits 
“intercept[ion]” of “any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication,” and defines “intercept[ion]” as “the aural or 
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or 
oral communication through the use of any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device.”67  The plaintiffs alleged that, 
insofar as Viacom permitted Google to access URLs that 
revealed which videos a child watched, such as 
“http://www.nick.com/shows/penguins-of-madagascar,”68 
Google intercepted the “contents” of the plaintiffs’ 
communications.  The District Court disagreed.  It concluded 
that a URL is more akin to a telephone number (whose 
interception cannot support a Wiretap Act claim) than a 
substantive conversation (whose interception can give rise to 
                                                 
66 Nickelodeon I, 2014 WL 3012873, at *13 (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(d)(2)). 
67 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), 2510(4). 
68 First Compl. ¶¶ 78, 140. 
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such a claim).69  The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
Wiretap Act claim on this ground as well.70   
 Google vindicated the District Court’s reasoning as to 
one-party consent, but not with respect to the definition of 
“contents.”  We there concluded that companies that place 
cookies on a computing device are, at least on facts analogous 
to those alleged here, “parties to any communications that 
they acquired,” meaning that such companies are not liable 
under the Wiretap Act.71  We also concluded that “some 
queried URLs qualify as content,”72 reasoning that a URL 
may convey “substantive information” about web browsing 
activity instead of mere “dialing, routing, addressing, or 
                                                 
69 Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) 
(explaining that pen registers “disclose only the telephone 
numbers that have been dialed—a means of establishing 
communication,” and not “any communication between the 
caller and the recipient of the call” (quoting United States v. 
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977))), with Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357–58 (1967) (holding that warrantless 
wiretapping of a telephone call violates the Fourth 
Amendment).  
70 Nickelodeon I, 2014 WL 3012873, at *14–15. 
71 Google, 806 F.3d at 145. 
72 Id. at 139 (“[T]he domain name portion of the URL—
everything before the ‘.com’—instructs a centralized web 
server to direct the user to a particular website, but post-
domain name portions of the URL are designed to 
communicate to the visited website which webpage content to 
send the user.”).   
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signaling information.”73  The first holding is fatal to the 
plaintiffs’ claim. 
 The plaintiffs try to resist this conclusion.  They 
contend that the one-party consent language in the Wiretap 
Act does not apply here because the plaintiffs were minors 
who were incapable of consenting at all.  We agree with the 
District Court that the plaintiffs “have cited no authority for 
the proposition that the Wiretap Act’s one-party consent 
regime depends on the age of the non-consenting party.”74  
Given the vast potential for unexpected liability whenever a 
minor happened to browse an Internet site that deployed 
cookies, we decline to adopt such a reading of the Act here.75 
 The plaintiffs also argue that, even if Google and 
Viacom were parties to any intercepted communications, they 
nonetheless acted unlawfully because the Wiretap Act 
imposes liability whenever someone intercepts information 
“for the purpose of committing . . . [a] tortious act.”76  Here, 
the plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ use of cookies 
amounted to the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion.  
We rejected a similar argument in Google, reasoning that the 
“tortious act” provision of the wiretapping statute only applies 
                                                 
73 Id. at 137.   
74 Nickelodeon I, 2014 WL 3012873, at *14.   
75 In addition, adopting the plaintiffs’ view could mean that 
the alleged inability of a minor to consent would vitiate 
another party’s consent, which we conclude would be 
inconsistent with the Wiretap Act’s statutory language.   
76 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
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when “the offender intercepted the communication for the 
purpose of a tortious or criminal act that is independent of the 
intentional act of recording.”77  Consistent with our reasoning 
in Google, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ wiretapping claim.78    
C. The California Invasion of Privacy Act  
 The California Invasion of Privacy Act “broadly 
prohibits the interception of wire communications and 
disclosure of the contents of such intercepted 
communications.”79  Google affirmed the dismissal of a claim 
                                                 
77 Google, 806 F.3d at 145 (quoting Caro v. Weintraub, 618 
F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2010)).   
78 The Wiretap Act also makes it unlawful for a person to 
“intentionally . . . procure[] any other person to intercept or 
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic 
communications.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).  The plaintiffs 
broadly assert that “Viacom procured Google to intercept the 
content of the Plaintiffs’ communications with other websites, 
and, upon information and belief, profited from Google’s 
unauthorized tracking on other sites . . . .”  (Pls. Br. at 8.)  The 
plaintiffs’ allegations of procurement in this case are entirely 
conclusory and therefore fail to comport with “the Supreme 
Court’s teaching that all aspects of a complaint must rest on 
‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ and not ‘mere conclusory 
statements.’”  Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 194 (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009)).   
79 Google, 806 F.3d at 152 (quoting Tavernetti v. Superior 
Court, 583 P.2d 737, 739 (Cal. 1978)).   
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under the California Act on the view that, like the federal 
wiretapping statute, the California Act does not apply when 
the alleged interceptor was a party to the communications.80  
For the same reason, we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ similar claim here.81 
D. The Federal Stored Communications Act  
 Passed in 1986, the Stored Communications Act aims 
to prevent “potential intrusions on individual privacy arising 
from illicit access to ‘stored communications in remote 
computing operations and large data banks that stored e-
mails.’”82  A person violates the Stored Communications Act 
                                                 
80 Id. (stating that the California Invasion of Privacy Act “is 
aimed only at ‘eavesdropping, or the secret monitoring of 
conversations by third parties’” (quoting Ribas v. Clark, 696 
P.2d 637, 640 (Cal. 1985) (in bank))). 
81 In their submission regarding Google’s application to the 
present case, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants also may 
be liable under § 632 of the California Invasion of Privacy 
Act, which prohibits eavesdropping on or recording 
confidential communications.  The plaintiffs did not discuss 
§ 632 in their complaints, nor did they brief its application 
before us.  Accordingly, any arguments based on § 632 are 
now waived.  See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 
845 (3d Cir. 1994) (“This court has consistently held that it 
will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on 
appeal.”).  
82 Google, 806 F.3d at 145 (quoting Garcia v. City of 
Laredo, Tex., 702 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
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whenever he or she “(1) intentionally accesses without 
authorization a facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally 
exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby 
obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or 
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in 
such system.”83   
 In Google, we affirmed dismissal of a claim under the 
Stored Communications Act because, in our view, personal 
computing devices were not protected “facilities” under the 
statute.84  For the same reason, we will affirm dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ Stored Communications Act claim here.85  
                                                 
83 Id. at 145–46 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)). 
84 Id. at 148. 
85 The plaintiffs argue that, even if Google stated that “a 
personal computing device” is not a protected facility under 
the Stored Communications Act, it did not go so far as to hold 
that a personal web browser is not a protected facility.  See 
Ltr. from J. Frickleton to Ct. at 4 (Nov. 24, 2015).  This 
argument parses the language of Google too finely.  Google 
explained that “[t]he origin of the Stored Communications 
Act confirms that Congress crafted the statute to specifically 
protect information held by centralized communication 
providers.”  806 F.3d at 147.  Since neither a personal 
computing device nor a personal web browser is akin to a 
“centralized communication provider,” the plaintiffs’ 
proposed distinction does not salvage their claim.   See ACTV, 
Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 650, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (defining “web browser” as “a software application that 
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E. The New Jersey Computer Related 
Offenses Act  
 The New Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act 
makes it unlawful to alter, damage, access, or obtain data 
from a computer without authorization.86  It also permits “[a] 
person or enterprise damaged in business or property” to sue 
for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as fees and 
costs.87  The plaintiffs allege that Viacom and Google 
violated the New Jersey Act by using Internet cookies to 
“access[] Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ computers in order 
to illegally harvest Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ personal 
information” without their consent.88   
 The District Court dismissed this claim because, in its 
view, the plaintiffs failed to allege that they had been 
“damaged in business or property,” as the plain text of the 
New Jersey Act requires.  The plaintiffs believe that the 
District Court erred by failing to credit their theory of 
damage—namely, that the defendants’ appropriation of their 
personal information, without compensation, constituted 
                                                                                                             
 
can be used to locate and display web pages in human-
readable form”); New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 
2d 76, 245–46 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[A] web browser provides the 
ability for the end user to select, retrieve, and perceive 
resources on the Web.”). 
86 N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:38A–3. 
87 Id.  
88 Second Compl. ¶ 153.   
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unjust enrichment.  The plaintiffs concede that “unjust 
enrichment has never been used as a measure of damages” 
under the New Jersey Act, but nonetheless encourage us to 
embrace this novel theory now.89  We decline to do so.   
 In the first place, we have previously said that a claim 
under the New Jersey Act “require[s] proof of some activity 
vis-à-vis the information other than simply gaining access to 
it,”90 and the plaintiffs allege the defendants did no more than 
“gain access” to their information here.  In addition, crediting 
this novel theory of injury would be inconsistent with our 
treatment of similar allegations in Google.  The plaintiffs 
there brought claims for violation of the federal Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act,91 which, like the New Jersey Act, 
requires a private plaintiff to show proof of “damage or 
loss.”92  The Google plaintiffs failed to satisfy this 
requirement because they “allege[d] no facts suggesting that 
they ever participated or intended to participate in the market 
[for sale of their information], or that the defendants 
prevented them from capturing the full value of their internet 
usage information for themselves.”93  Nor did they ever assert 
that “they sought to monetize information about their internet 
usage, nor that they ever stored their information with a future 
                                                 
89 Pls. Reply Br. at 25.   
90 P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal 
Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 509 (3d Cir. 2005). 
91 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
92 Id. § 1030(g).   
93 Google, 806 F.3d at 149. 
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sale in mind.”94    
 The plaintiffs’ claim here fails for the same reason.  To 
be sure, the New Jersey courts are free to interpret the 
requirement to show “damage[] in business or property” 
under the New Jersey Act differently than federal courts 
interpret the analogous requirement in the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act.  But the plaintiffs have pointed us to no 
authority indicating that federal and state courts understand 
the two laws differently.  In fact, the opposite appears to be 
true:  courts seem to have interpreted the New Jersey Act in 
harmony with its federal counterpart.95 
 Because we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to 
allege the kind of injury that the New Jersey Act requires, we 
will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of their claim.   
III. Claims Raising Issues Beyond Those We 
Addressed in Google 
 While our spadework in Google goes a long way 
towards resolving this case, it does not do so entirely.  The 
plaintiffs bring two claims—one for violation of the Video 
Privacy Protection Act, and one for intrusion upon seclusion 
under New Jersey law—that require us to break new ground. 
                                                 
94 Id.  
95 See, e.g., Mu Sigma, Inc. v. Affine, Inc., No. 12-cv-1323 
(FLW), 2013 WL 3772724, at *9–10 (D.N.J. July 17, 2013) 
(dismissing claims under the state and federal computer 
statutes for identical reasons).   
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A. The Video Privacy Protection Act  
 Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act in 
1988 after the Washington City Paper published Supreme 
Court nominee Robert Bork’s video rental history.96  “The 
paper had obtained (without Judge Bork’s knowledge or 
consent) a list of the 146 films that the Bork family had rented 
from a Washington, D.C.-area video store.”97  According to 
the Senate Report accompanying the law’s passage, Congress 
passed the Act “[t]o preserve personal privacy with respect to 
the rental, purchase or delivery of video tapes or similar audio 
visual materials.”98  
 The Act creates a private cause of action for plaintiffs 
to sue persons who disclose information about their video-
watching habits.  Unfortunately, as the Seventh Circuit has 
noted, the Act “is not well drafted,”99 requiring us to begin by 
summarizing a bit of legislative jargon.  The Act defines 
several key terms:     
                                                 
96 See S. Rep. No. 100-599, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1 (“Senate Report”), also available at 
1988 WL 243503. 
97 Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 
(9th Cir. 2015).  
98 Senate Report at 1. 
99 Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 
538 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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 Consumer:  “any renter, purchaser, or 
subscriber of goods or services from a video 
tape service provider.”100 
 Video tape service provider:  “any person, 
engaged in the business, in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, 
sale, or delivery of prerecorded video 
cassette tapes or similar audio visual 
materials.”101 
 Personally identifiable information: 
“includes information which identifies a 
person as having requested or obtained 
specific video materials or services from a 
video tape service provider.”102  
 To state a claim under the Act, a plaintiff must allege 
that “[a] video tape service provider . . . knowingly 
disclose[d], to any person, personally identifiable information 
concerning any consumer of such provider.”103  The Act 
(i) sets a minimum penalty of $2,500 per violation, (ii) 
permits a plaintiff to recover punitive damages, reasonable 
attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs, and (iii) empowers district 
                                                 
100 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). 
101 Id. § 2710(a)(4). 
102 Id. § 2710(a)(3).  
103 Id. § 2710(b)(1). 
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courts to provide appropriate equitable relief.104   
 The plaintiffs allege that Viacom disclosed to Google 
URL information that effectively revealed what videos they 
watched on Nickelodeon’s websites, and static digital 
identifiers (such as IP addresses, browser fingerprints, and 
unique device identifiers) that enabled Google to link the 
watching of those videos to their real-world identities.105  
                                                 
104 Id. § 2710(c)(2)(A)–(D). 
105 Second Compl. ¶¶ 75–76, 143–46.  As a technical matter, 
IP addresses themselves “may be either ‘static’ (remain 
constant) or ‘dynamic’ (change periodically).”  Klimas v. 
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 465 F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 
2006).  Quite apart from this distinction, we use the phrase 
“static digital identifiers” to refer to the various types of 
information allegedly disclosed by the defendants, including 
IP addresses, browser fingerprints, unique device ID numbers, 
and cookie identifiers.  By using the word “static,” we mean 
to convey that these identifiers persisted across time in a 
manner that allegedly enabled the defendants to identify the 
plaintiffs and to catalogue their online browsing habits. 
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They bring claims under the Act against both defendants.106  
1. Whether Google is an Appropriate 
Defendant under the Act 
 The first question we confront is whom, exactly, the 
Act permits the plaintiffs to sue.  The plaintiffs contend that 
the Act allows them to sue both a video tape service provider 
who discloses personally identifiable information and a 
person who receives that information.  To put it another way, 
the parties seem to agree that the video clerk who leaked 
Judge Bork’s rental history clearly would have been liable 
under the Act had it been in force at the time—but what about 
the reporter at the Washington City Paper to whom he leaked 
the information?  The plaintiffs say he would have been liable 
as well.  Google (standing-in for the reporter in our fact 
pattern) disagrees.  
 The text of the statute is not clear on this point.  
Subsection (b) states that a “video tape service provider who 
knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable 
                                                 
106 The defendants do not argue that the plaintiffs were not 
“consumers” of Viacom’s video services—i.e., persons who 
“rent[], purchase[], or subscribe[]” to goods or services of a 
service provider.  18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).  We note that the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that persons who download a free 
application to watch videos on their smartphones are not 
“subscribers” under the Act.  See Ellis v. Cartoon Network, 
Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015).  In the absence of 
any argument to the contrary, we will assume that the 
plaintiffs were consumers of Viacom’s video services. 
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information concerning any consumer of such provider shall 
be liable to the aggrieved person for the relief provided in 
subsection (c).”107  Subsection (c), in turn, creates a private 
cause of action.  It states that “[a]ny person aggrieved by any 
act of a person in violation of this section may bring a civil 
action in a United States district court.”108   
 But what constitutes a “violation of this section”?  
Google claims that the Act is violated only when a video tape 
service provider discloses personally identifiable information, 
as proscribed in subsection (b).  The plaintiffs, by contrast, 
insist that they are just as “aggrieved” when a third party 
receives personally identifiable information as when a video 
tape service provider discloses it.  In support of this argument, 
the plaintiffs rely exclusively on a somewhat dated case from 
a district court in our Circuit, Dirkes v. Borough of 
Runnemede.109  We find the plaintiffs’ reliance on Dirkes 
unpersuasive. 
                                                 
107 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).  Actually, this provision of the 
Act refers to “the relief provided in subsection (d),” but that is 
clearly a scrivener’s error.  As Judge Posner explained in 
Sterk, “the only ‘relief’ provided [in subsection (d)] is 
exclusion of the personally identifiable information from 
evidence,” and “it is very unlikely that a video tape service 
provider would ever be submitting, as evidence in a legal 
proceeding, personally identifiable information that the 
provider had disclosed.”  672 F.3d at 537. 
108 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(1). 
109 936 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.J. 1996). 
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 Dirkes was a former police officer who was suspected 
of stealing pornographic videos from a citizen’s apartment.  
The allegations led local prosecutors to indict Dirkes for 
committing misconduct and led the local police department to 
open disciplinary proceedings.  Even though Dirkes was 
eventually acquitted of the misconduct charge, the Borough’s 
inquiry continued.  A Borough investigator learned from a 
video store clerk that Dirkes had rented several pornographic 
movies, and information about Dirkes’ video rental history 
was included in an internal affairs memorandum.  That 
memorandum “was distributed to the Borough’s special 
counsel, who in turn distributed it in connection with Plaintiff 
Dirkes’ disciplinary hearing and in a proceeding before the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County.”110   
 In response to the dissemination of information about 
his video rental history, Dirkes and his wife sued the 
investigator, the police department, and the Borough for 
violating the Video Privacy Protection Act.111  The district 
court rejected the defendants’ argument that, as non-
disclosing parties, they could not be liable under the Act.  
Instead, it reasoned that Congress’s broad remedial purposes 
in passing the statute would best be served by allowing 
                                                 
110 Id. at 236. 
111 Id.  Another section of the Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(b)(2)(C), permits a video tape service provider to 
disclose information “to a law enforcement agency pursuant 
to a warrant . . . , a grand jury subpoena, or a court order.”  
The video clerk in Dirkes simply provided the information to 
the investigating officer when asked.  See Dirkes, 936 
F. Supp. at 236. 
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plaintiffs to sue “those individuals who have come to possess 
(and who could disseminate) the private information.”112 
 No other court has interpreted the Act this way.  As the 
Sixth Circuit explained in Daniel v. Cantrell,113 the better 
view is that subsection (b) makes certain conduct—the 
disclosure of personally identifiable information by a video 
tape service provider—unlawful, and subsection (c) creates a 
cause of action against persons who engage in such 
conduct.114  Indeed, “if any person could be liable under the 
Act, there would be no need for the Act to define a [video 
tape service provider] in the first place.”115  Rejecting Dirkes’ 
focus on the Act’s remedial purposes, Cantrell observed that 
“[j]ust because Congress’ goal was to prevent the disclosure 
of private information, does not mean that Congress intended 
the implementation of every conceivable method of 
                                                 
112 Id. at 240.  Alternatively, the district court concluded that 
the defendants had potentially violated subsection (d) of the 
Act, which bars the introduction of illegally disclosed 
information in “any trial, hearing . . . or other proceeding in or 
before any court . . . department . . . or other authority of the 
United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State.”  
Id. at 240 n.8.  The present case does not require us to opine 
on the correctness of this interpretation.   
113 375 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2004). 
114 Id. at 382–84 (stating that Dirkes concluded that any 
person could be liable for unlawful disclosures “only by 
misreading the Act”). 
115 Id. (emphasis in original).   
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preventing disclosures.”116   The Seventh Circuit adopted the 
same reading of the Act in Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, 
LLC,117 concluding that “the more plausible interpretation is 
that [subsection (c)] is limited to enforcing the prohibition of 
disclosure.”118   
 We agree with our colleagues in the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits.  Because we conclude that only video tape service 
providers that disclose personally identifiable information can 
be liable under subsection (c) of the Act, and because Google 
is not alleged to have disclosed any such information here, we 
will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the claim against 
Google.119     
2. Whether Viacom Disclosed 
“Personally Identifiable Information”  
 Viacom also argues that it never disclosed “personally 
identifiable information” about children who viewed videos 
on its websites.  As we shall see, what counts as personally 
                                                 
116 Id. at 384.   
117 672 F.3d 535. 
118 Id. at 538.  
119 The plaintiffs argued before the District Court that 
Google was a video tape service provider, but did not raise the 
same argument on appeal.  We therefore need not address that 
argument here.  See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 
162 (3d Cir. 2008) (describing “the requirement that an 
appellant [must] raise an issue in his opening brief or else 
waive the issue on appeal”). 
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identifiable information under the Act is not entirely clear.    
 The plaintiffs claim that Viacom disclosed to Google at 
least eleven pieces of information about children who 
browsed its websites.120  Three, in particular, are central to 
their claim under the Act.  The first is a user’s IP address, “a 
number assigned to each device that is connected to the 
Internet” that permits computer-specific online tracking.121  
The second is a user’s browser and operating system settings, 
which comprise a so-called “browser fingerprint.”122  The 
plaintiffs claim that these profiles are so detailed that the odds 
of two people having the same browser fingerprint are 1 in 
286,777.123  The third is a computing device’s “unique device 
identifier.”124   
                                                 
120 Second Compl. ¶ 143.   
121 See United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 517 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“Although most devices do not have their own, 
permanent (‘static’) addresses, in general an IP address for a 
device connected to the Internet is unique in the sense that no 
two devices have the same IP address at the same time.”).  
Vosburgh affirmed a defendant’s conviction for possession of 
child pornography after FBI agents recorded the defendant’s 
IP address and then subpoenaed the defendant’s Internet 
service provider to learn his identity.   
122 Second Compl. ¶ 61. 
123 Id. ¶ 62. 
124 Nowhere in their complaints or in their briefing do the 
plaintiffs explain what a “unique device identifier” actually is, 
although other cases give us some indication.  For example, 
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 What these pieces of information have in common is 
that they allegedly permit Google to track the same computer 
across time.  So, for example, if someone with a Google 
account were to run a Google search from his or her 
computer, and then that person’s child were to visit Nick.com 
and watch a video on that same computer, the plaintiffs claim 
that Google could “match” the data (based on IP address, 
browser fingerprint, or unique device identifier) to determine 
that the same computer was involved in both activities.  In the 
plaintiffs’ view, this means that Viacom, by permitting 
Google to use cookies on its website, effectively disclosed 
“information which identifies [a particular child] as having 
requested or obtained specific video materials or services 
from a video tape service provider,”125 thereby violating the 
Act.  The plaintiffs also claim that Viacom acted 
“knowingly,” as the Act requires, because Viacom permitted 
Google to host ads on its websites despite being “aware of 
Google’s ubiquitous presence on the Internet and its tracking 
of users.”126 
                                                                                                             
 
one of the types of information at issue in Ellis v. Cartoon 
Network, Inc., another case brought under the Video Privacy 
Protection Act, was the device ID on Android phones.  The 
Ellis Court described that ID as “a 64–bit number (hex string) 
that is randomly generated when a user initially sets up his 
device and should remain constant for the lifetime of the 
user’s device.”  803 F.3d at 1254.  Presumably the plaintiffs 
are referring to something similar. 
125 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3).  
126 Second Compl. ¶ 93.  
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 Viacom, by contrast, argues that static digital 
identifiers, such as IP addresses, do not qualify as personally 
identifiable information.  It encourages us to interpret the Act 
against the backdrop of the problem it was meant to rectify—
the disclosure of an actual person’s video rental history.  So, 
for example, Viacom points to the Senate Report, which states 
that “personally identifiable information is intended to be 
transaction-oriented,” meaning that it “identifies a particular 
person as having engaged in a specific transaction with a 
video tape service provider.”127  Viacom reads this passage to 
suggest that the Act’s authors had brick-and-mortar 
transactions in mind when they crafted the law.  In Viacom’s 
view, the information described by the plaintiffs is not 
personally identifiable because it does not, by itself, identify a 
particular person.  Rather, it is “coded information, used for 
decades to facilitate the operation of the Internet, that 
theoretically could be used by the recipient to identify the 
location of a connected computer”—not to unmask the 
identity of a person using that computer.128 
 The parties’ contrasting positions reflect a fundamental 
disagreement over what kinds of information are sufficiently 
“personally identifying” for their disclosure to trigger liability 
under the Video Privacy Protection Act.  At one end of the 
spectrum, of course, is a person’s actual name.  Then there are 
pieces of information, such as a telephone number or a 
physical address, which may not by themselves identify a 
particular person but from which it would likely be possible to 
identify a person by consulting publicly available sources, 
                                                 
127 Senate Report at 12.   
128 Viacom Br. at 16.   
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such as a phone book or property records.  Further down the 
spectrum are pieces of information, like social security 
numbers, which are associated with individual persons but 
might not be easily matched to such persons without 
consulting another entity, such as a credit reporting agency or 
government bureau. 
 The kind of information at issue here—static digital 
identifiers—falls even further down the spectrum.  To an 
average person, an IP address or a digital code in a cookie file 
would likely be of little help in trying to identify an actual 
person.  A great deal of copyright litigation, for example, 
involves illegal downloads of movies or music online.  Such 
suits often begin with a complaint against a “John Doe” 
defendant based on an Internet user’s IP address.  Only later, 
after the plaintiff has connected the IP address to an actual 
person by means of a subpoena directed to an Internet service 
provider, is the complaint amended to reflect the defendant’s 
name.129  
 Numerous district courts have grappled with the 
question of whether the Video Privacy Protection Act applies 
to static digital identifiers.  Most have followed the rule 
adopted in In re Hulu Privacy Litigation.130  The court there 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Records Inc. v. Walker, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 460, 463 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Plaintiffs initially filed 
this action as a ‘Doe’ lawsuit and subsequently amended the 
Complaint after Defendant’s identity was obtained from 
Allegheny College pursuant to a Rule 45 subpoena.”). 
130 No. 11-cv-3764 (LB), 2014 WL 1724344 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 28, 2014).   
47 
 
concluded that static digital identifiers that could, in theory, 
be combined with other information to identify a person do 
not count as “personally identifiable information” under the 
Act, at least by themselves.131  Other decisions are in 
accord.132 
 The district courts have not, however, been unanimous.  
The plaintiffs direct us to Yershov v. Gannett Satellite 
Information Network, Inc.133  The plaintiff there downloaded 
USA Today’s free application onto his smartphone.  He 
alleged that Gannett, which publishes USA Today, shared 
information about videos he watched on his phone with a 
third-party analytics company, Adobe Systems, Inc.  The 
information did not include the plaintiff’s name or address, 
but rather his cell phone identification number and his GPS 
coordinates at the time he viewed a particular video.134  
Rejecting the approach taken in Hulu, Yershov concluded that 
                                                 
131 Id. at *11 (concluding that “a unique anonymized ID 
alone is not [personally identifiable information] but context 
could render it not anonymous and the equivalent of the 
identification of a specific person”).   
132 See, e.g., Robinson v. Disney Online, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 
2015 WL 6161284, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Eichenberger v. 
ESPN, Inc., No. 14-cv-463 (TSZ), 2015 WL 7252985, at *4–5 
(W.D. Wash. May 7, 2015); Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 
No. 14-cv-484 (TWT), 2014 WL 5023535, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 
Oct. 8, 2014), aff’d on other grounds, 803 F.3d 1251 
(11th Cir. 2015).   
133 104 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D. Mass. 2015). 
134 Id. at 138.  
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any unique identifier—including a person’s smartphone ID—
is personally identifiable information.  It recognized that, in 
asking it to reach this conclusion, the plaintiff was 
“attempt[ing] to place a square peg (modern electronic 
technology) into a round hole (a statute written in 1988 aimed 
principally at videotape rental services).”135  Even so, the 
court stated that the Act applied to the disclosure of static 
identifiers that could theoretically permit a company like 
Adobe Systems to identify an individual video watcher.136  
The First Circuit recently affirmed that conclusion.137 
 In our view, the proper meaning of the phrase 
“personally identifiable information” is not straightforward.  
As a textual matter, “[t]he precise scope” of such information 
“is difficult to discern from the face of the statute—whether 
                                                 
135 Id. at 140.   
136 Id. at 145–46 (discussing Nickelodeon I and stating that 
its “conclusion that ‘[personally identifiable information] is 
information which must, without more, itself link an actual 
person to actual video materials’ is flawed”).   
137 Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc.,  
--- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 1719825, at *2–3 (1st Cir. 2016).  
Despite its expansive interpretation of what qualifies as 
personally identifiable information, the district court in 
Yershov concluded that the plaintiff in that case was not a 
“subscriber” within the meaning of the Video Privacy 
Protection Act and therefore dismissed the case.  The First 
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.  See id. at *3–6. 
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read in isolation or in its broader statutory context.”138  As a 
practical matter, norms about what ought to be treated as 
private information on the Internet are both constantly in flux 
and often depend on the novelty of the technology at issue.  
Even so, we find Viacom’s narrower understanding of what 
constitutes “personally identifiable information” under the 
Act more persuasive than the alternative offered by the 
plaintiffs.    
 We begin with principles of statutory interpretation.  
We have said that when “the text [of a statute] is ambiguous 
or does not reveal congressional intent ‘with sufficient 
precision’ to resolve our inquiry[,] . . . ‘a court traditionally 
refers to the legislative history and the atmosphere in which 
the statute was enacted in an attempt to determine the 
congressional purpose.’”139  Likewise, the Supreme Court had 
instructed us that “[w]hen technological change has rendered 
its literal terms ambiguous, [a law] must be construed in light 
of [its] basic purpose.”140  Our review of the legislative 
history convinces us that Congress’s purpose in passing the 
Video Privacy Protection Act was quite narrow:  to prevent 
disclosures of information that would, with little or no extra 
                                                 
138 Disney, 2015 WL 6161284, at *2. 
139 Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 418 
(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting, in succession, Allen ex rel. Martin v. 
LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011), and In 
re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 
(3d Cir. 2009)). 
140 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 
156 (1975) (interpreting the Copyright Act).   
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effort, permit an ordinary recipient to identify a particular 
person’s video-watching habits.  We do not think that, when 
Congress passed the Act, it intended for the law to cover 
factual circumstances far removed from those that motivated 
its passage.    
 This becomes apparent by tracing the Video Privacy 
Protection Act’s legislative history.  The Senate version of the 
Act was introduced in May of 1988, and the coordinate House 
bill was introduced about a month later.  The two bills were 
considered in a joint hearing in August of 1988 before the 
relevant House and Senate subcommittees.141  The then-extant 
Senate bill would have punished both disclosures relating to 
video tape service providers and disclosures relating to library 
borrowing records.142  Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, 
characterized the purpose of the Senate bill as follows:  
Most of us rent movies at video stores and we 
check out books from our community libraries.  
These activities generate an enormous report of 
personal activity that, if it is going to be 
disclosed, makes it very, very difficult for a 
                                                 
141 Senate Report at 5; see also Video and Library Privacy 
Protection Act of 1988:  Hearing on H.R. 4947 & S. 2361 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. 
of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary & the Subcomm. 
on Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. (1988) (“Committee Report”). 
142 Committee Report at 13–15 (quoting relevant text of 
S. 2361).   
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person to protect his or her privacy.   
 
It really isn’t anybody’s business what books or 
what videos somebody gets.  It doesn’t make 
any difference if somebody is up for 
confirmation as a Supreme Court Justice or they 
are running the local grocery store.  It is not 
your business.143   
 Similarly, Representative Robert Kastenmeier, 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, decried “attempts 
to obtain patrons’ [library] records, under circumstances 
that . . . would violate most peoples’ perceptions of their right 
to privacy.”144  He expressed the view that “American citizens 
should not have to worry that a government agent, or a 
reporter, or anyone else, will be able to find out what they are 
reading,” and argued that “[t]hese principles apply as much to 
customers of video stores as to patrons of libraries.”145 
 According to the Senate Report, the provisions of the 
Act relating to libraries were removed because the Senate 
Judiciary Committee “was unable to resolve questions 
regarding the application of such a provision for law 
enforcement.”146  Even so, we think that legislators’ initial 
focus on both libraries and video stores indicates that the Act 
                                                 
143 Id. at 18.   
144 Id. at 21–22.   
145 Id. at 22–23.   
146 Senate Report at 8.   
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was meant to prevent disclosures of information capable of 
identifying an actual person’s reading or video-watching 
habits.  We therefore agree with our colleagues who have 
reviewed this same legislative history and concluded that the 
Act “protects personally identifiable information that 
identifies a specific person and ties that person to particular 
videos that the person watched.”147 
 The plaintiffs contend that, contrary to our 
interpretation, Congress intended to pass a broad statute that 
would protect consumer privacy even as video-watching 
technology changed over time.  To be fair, there are portions 
of the legislative history that might be read to support such a 
view.148  The text itself is also amenable to such an 
interpretation.  After all, the Act says that personally 
identifiable information “includes information which 
identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific 
video materials or services from a video tape service 
                                                 
147 Hulu, 2014 WL 1724344, at *8; see also Eichenberger, 
2015 WL 7252985, at *4 (“The focus of this statute . . . is on 
whether the disclosure by itself identifies a particular person 
as having viewed a specific video.”). 
148 See, e.g., Committee Report at 19 (“These bills are an 
effort to keep up to date with changing technology and 
changing social patterns with respect to the use of materials 
which ought to be clearly private.”) (statement of 
Representative Kastenmeier); id. at 55 (“These precious 
[privacy] rights have grown increasingly vulnerable with the 
growth of advanced information technology.”) (testimony of 
Janlori Goldman, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties 
Union).   
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provider,”149 and Congress’s use of the word “includes” could 
suggest that Congress intended for future courts to read 
contemporary norms about privacy into the statute’s original 
text.150  But we ultimately do not think that the definition of 
personally identifiable information in the Act is so broad as to 
cover the kinds of static digital identifiers at issue here.  This 
is not to say that the Act has become a dead letter with the 
demise of the corner video store.  If, for example, Google 
were to start purposefully leaking its customers’ YouTube 
video-watching histories, we think such disclosures would 
almost certainly violate the Act.  But trying to analogize 
between that kind of disclosure and Google’s use of cookies 
on Viacom’s websites is, at best, a strained enterprise.   
 Nor are we persuaded by the plaintiffs’ citations to 
other federal privacy laws.  For example, the plaintiffs ask us 
to consider how Congress used the phrase “personally 
identifiable information” (or its equivalents) in (i) the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act,151 (ii) the Gramm-
Leach Financial Modernization Act,152 (iii) the Federal 
                                                 
149 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (emphasis added).  
150 See Yershov, 2016 WL 1719825, at *2 (noting that “the 
word ‘includes’ . . . normally implies that the proffered 
definition falls short of capturing the whole meaning”); 
Senate Report at 12 (stating that the use of the word 
“includes” is intended to “establish a minimum, but not 
exclusive, definition of personally identifiable information”). 
151 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8). 
152 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4). 
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Education Rights and Privacy Act,153 and (iv) the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.154  Having done 
so, we do not think that the language in these other laws is as 
helpful as the plaintiffs suppose.  If anything, the expansion 
of privacy laws since the Video Privacy Protection Act’s 
passage demonstrates that, whatever else “personally 
identifiable information” meant in 1988, it did not encompass 
the kind of information that Viacom allegedly disclosed to 
Google.   
 We see this perhaps most clearly by juxtaposing the 
1988 Video Privacy Protection Act with the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), which Congress passed a 
decade later.155  That statute limits the gathering of personal 
information from children under the age of 13 on the 
Internet.156  It also requires parental consent for the collection, 
use, or disclosure of children’s personal information online 
and directs the Federal Trade Commission to issue regulations 
                                                 
153 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (defining 
“personally identifiable information” in the education 
context).   
154 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6). 
155 Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. C, Title XIII, §§ 1301–1308, 
112 Stat. 2681–728, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506. 
156 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1) (defining the term “child” to mean 
“an individual under the age of 13”), 6501(10)(A)(i)–(ii) 
(stating that a website “directed to children” is “a commercial 
website or online service that is targeted to children” or “that 
portion of a commercial website or online service that is 
targeted to children”). 
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to that effect.157  The statute defines “personal information” to 
include: 
[A] first and last name; a home or other physical 
address . . . ; an e-mail address; a telephone 
number; a Social Security number; any other 
identifier that the [Federal Trade Commission] 
determines permits the physical or online 
contacting of a specific individual; or 
information concerning the child or the parents 
of that child that the website collects online 
from the child and combines with an identifier 
described in this paragraph.158     
 The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated two 
successive rules under this provision.  The first, which 
became effective in April of 2000,159 defined “personal 
information” to include not only the kinds of information 
enumerated in the text of the law, but also “[a] persistent 
identifier, such as a customer number held in a cookie or a 
                                                 
157 Id. § 6502(a)(1) (requiring compliance with regulations), 
6502(b)(1) (delegating authority to the Commission), 
6502(b)(1)(A)(ii) (directing the Commission to establish 
regulations requiring the “verifiable parental consent for the 
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from 
children”). 
158 Id. § 6501(8)(A)–(G).   
159 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 59,888 (Nov. 3, 1999), available at 1999 WL 990699 
(promulgating final rule to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 312). 
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processor serial number, where such identifier is associated 
with individually identifiable information.”160  An updated 
regulation, effective in July of 2013,161 expanded this 
definition to include any “persistent identifier that can be used 
to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or 
online services,” including but not limited to “a customer 
number held in a cookie, an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a 
processor or device serial number, or unique device 
identifier.”162   
 It seems clear that the Commission’s updated 
definition of “personal information” comes much closer to 
capturing, if not wholly covering, the kinds of information at 
issue in this case.163  But that is of little help to the plaintiffs’ 
present claim.  Instead, the evolution of these regulations 
demonstrates that, when Congress passed COPPA, it gave the 
Federal Trade Commission authority to expand the types of 
                                                 
160 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2000). 
161 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 
3,972 (Jan. 17, 2013), available at 2013 WL 169584 
(promulgating updated rule). 
162 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2013) (emphasis added). 
163 The Federal Trade Commission’s first definition of 
“personal information” would seemingly not cover the kind of 
information at issue here because, while that definition did 
include a reference to numerical codes stored in cookies, it 
also required such codes to be linked to the other kinds of 
information listed in the statute.  Gender and birthdate, the 
two kinds of information Viacom allegedly collected when 
children signed up for its websites, are not on that list.   
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information that count as personally identifying under that 
law.  In this way, Congress built flexibility into the statute to 
keep pace with evolving technology.  The Video Privacy 
Protection Act, by contrast, does not empower an 
administrative agency to augment the definition of 
“personally identifiable information” in light of changing 
circumstances or new technologies.  The meaning of that 
phrase in the Act is, it would appear, more static.   
  Subsequent developments confirm this view.  Congress 
amended the Video Privacy Protection in 2013,164 modifying 
those provisions of the law governing how a consumer can 
consent to the disclosure of personally identifiable 
information.165  The legislative history of the 2013 
amendments demonstrates that Congress was keenly aware of 
how technological changes have affected the original Act.  As 
one Senate report put it:  
At the time of the [1988 law’s] enactment, 
consumers rented movies from video stores.  
The method that Americans used to watch 
videos in 1988—the VHS cassette tape—is now 
                                                 
164 Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 Stat. 2414.  While Congress 
did not pass the law until January of 2013, it is titled the 
“Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012.”   
165 See Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1253 (explaining that these 
“changes allowed consumers greater flexibility to share their 
video viewing preferences, while maintaining their privacy, 
by clarifying that video tape service providers may obtain 
informed, written consent of consumers on an ongoing basis 
via the Internet”). 
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obsolete.  In its place, the Internet has 
revolutionized the way that American 
consumers rent and watch movies and television 
programs.  Today, so-called “on-demand” cable 
services and Internet streaming services allow 
consumers to watch movies or TV shows on 
televisions, laptop computers, and cell 
phones.166 
 Despite this recognition, Congress did not update the 
definition of personally identifiable information in the 
statute.167  What’s more, it chose not to do so despite the fact 
that the amicus supporting the plaintiffs here, the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, submitted written testimony that 
included the following exhortation:  
[T]he Act does not explicitly include Internet 
Protocol (IP) Addresses in the definition [of 
personally identifiable information].  
IP addresses can be used to identify users and 
link consumers to digital video rentals.  They 
are akin to Internet versions of consumers’ 
home telephone numbers. . . .  We would 
propose the addition of Internet Protocol (IP) 
Addresses and account identifiers to the 
                                                 
166 S. Rep. No. 112-258, at 2 (2012). 
167 See H.R. Rep. No. 112-312, at 3 (2011) (noting that the 
updated version of the legislation “does not change . . . the 
definition of ‘personally identifiable information’”). 
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definition of [personally identifiable 
information] . . . .168 
 We think Congress’s decision to retain the 1988 
definition of personally identifiable information indicates that 
the Act serves different purposes, and protects different 
constituencies, than other, broader privacy laws.  We of 
course appreciate that the passage of time often requires 
courts to apply old laws in new circumstances.169  Assessing 
congressional intent in these cases can be difficult; indeed, 
Congress may not have considered the temporal problem at 
all.  But here, our task is made easier by the fact that Congress 
has recently revisited the Video Privacy Protection Act and, 
despite the passage of nearly thirty years since its enactment, 
left the law almost entirely unchanged.  We have previously 
explained that “the weight given subsequent legislation and 
whether it constitutes a clarification or a repeal is a context- 
                                                 
168 The Video Privacy Protection Act:  Protecting Viewer 
Privacy in the 21st Century:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Privacy, Tech. and the Law of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 59–60 (2012).   
169 See, e.g., Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 685 F.3d 259, 284 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(stating that it would arguably “be irrational” to interpret a 
statutory directive to “maintain navigation,” inserted into a 
law in 1977, “to encompass only those activities that preserve 
bodies of water as they existed in 1977”); United States v. 
Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that 
Congress defined piracy in 1819 to reflect the evolving “law 
of nations” and rejecting the proposition “that the definition 
of general piracy was fixed in the early Nineteenth Century”). 
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and fact-dependent inquiry,”170 and “we may pay heed to the 
significance of subsequent legislation when it is apparent 
from the facts and context that it bears directly on Congress’s 
own understanding and intent.”171  We think Congress’s 
decision to leave the Act’s 1988 definition of personally 
identifiable information intact, despite recently revisiting the 
law, is one of those instances.   
 Nor does our decision today create a split with our 
colleagues in the First Circuit.  In interpreting the meaning of 
personally identifiable information in Yershov, the First 
Circuit focused on the fact that the defendant there allegedly 
disclosed not only what videos a person watched on his or her 
smartphone, but also the GPS coordinates of the phone’s 
location at the time the videos were watched.  In the First 
Circuit’s view, “[g]iven how easy it is to locate a GPS 
coordinate on a street map, this disclosure would enable most 
people to identify what are likely the home and work 
addresses of the viewer (e.g., Judge Bork’s home and the 
federal courthouse).”172  That conclusion merely demonstrates 
that GPS coordinates contain more power to identify a 
specific person than, in our view, an IP address, a device 
identifier, or a browser fingerprint.  Yershov itself 
acknowledges that “there is certainly a point at which the 
                                                 
170 Bd. of Trs. of IBT Local 863 Pension Fund v. C & S 
Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 802 F.3d 534, 546 (3d Cir. 2015). 
171 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., --- F.3d ---, 2016 
WL 1567236, at *14 (3d Cir. 2016). 
172 Yershov, 2016 WL 1719825, at *3 (internal footnote 
omitted).   
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linkage of information to identity becomes too uncertain, or 
too dependent on too much yet-to-be-done, or unforeseeable 
detective work” to trigger liability under this statute.173  We 
believe the information allegedly disclosed here is on that side 
of the divide.174 
 Of course, what we have said so far addresses the 
question of what counts as personally identifiable information 
in the abstract.  The wrinkle in this case is that the party to 
                                                 
173 Id.  
174 We note, however, that even a numeric identifier might 
qualify as personally identifiable information, at least in 
certain circumstances.  In Hulu, for example, the plaintiffs 
alleged that when someone visited Hulu’s website and 
watched a video, Hulu would display a Facebook “Like” 
button next to that video by sending a coded request to 
Facebook’s servers.  Before sending that request, Hulu would 
check to see if the user already had cookies on his or her 
machine indicating that the user was a Facebook member.  If 
so, Hulu would transmit that coded information to Facebook 
when it requested a “Like” button in such a way that 
Facebook could easily identify an account holder’s video 
preferences.  See Hulu, 2014 WL 1724344, at *5. 
Hulu concluded that such communications were “not merely 
the transmission of a unique, anonymous ID,” but rather the 
disclosure of “information that identifies the Hulu user’s 
actual identity on Facebook,” which, in the court’s view, was 
sufficient to count as personally identifiable information.  
Id. at *13.  Whether we would reach a similar conclusion on 
analogous facts we leave to a later case.   
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whom the plaintiffs’ information was disclosed is Google, a 
company whose entire business model is purportedly driven 
by the aggregation of information about Internet users.  The 
plaintiffs assert that Google can identify web users in the real 
world, and indeed seem to believe that Google, which 
purportedly “knows more details about American consumers 
than any company in history,”175 aggregates so much 
information that it has, in effect, turned the Internet into its 
own private data collection machine.  Or, as the plaintiffs’ 
amicus, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, puts it, 
concluding “that Google is unable to identify a user based on 
a combination of IP address . . . and other browser cookie 
data . . . would be like concluding the company that produces 
the phone book is unable to deduce the identity of an 
individual based on their telephone number.”176   
 Whether or not this is true, we do not think that a law 
from 1988 can be fairly read to incorporate such a 
contemporary understanding of Internet privacy.  The 
allegation that Google will assemble otherwise anonymous 
pieces of data to unmask the identity of individual children is, 
at least with respect to the kind of identifiers at issue here, 
simply too hypothetical to support liability under the Video 
Privacy Protection Act.   
 The argument also lacks a limiting principle.  What 
makes the claim about Google’s ubiquity so intuitively 
attractive is the size of Google’s user base.  Indeed, Google is 
large enough that we might well suppose that a significant 
                                                 
175 Pls. Br. at 10.    
176 Electronic Privacy Information Center Br. at 6.   
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number of its account holders also have children who watch 
videos on Viacom’s websites.  But that seems like distinction 
without a difference.  If an IP address were to count as 
personally identifiable information, either standing alone or 
coupled with similar data points, then the disclosure of an 
IP address to any Internet company with registered users 
might trigger liability under the Act.  Indeed, the import of the 
plaintiffs’ position seems to be that the use of third-party 
cookies on any website that streams video content is 
presumptively illegal.  We do not think the Video Privacy 
Protection Act sweeps quite so broadly.  
 We recognize that our interpretation of the phrase 
“personally identifiable information” has not resulted in a 
single-sentence holding capable of mechanistically deciding 
future cases.  We have not endeavored to craft such a rule, nor 
do we think, given the rapid pace of technological change in 
our digital era, such a rule would even be advisable.177  
Rather, we have tried to articulate a more general framework.  
In our view, personally identifiable information under the 
Video Privacy Protection Act means the kind of information 
that would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a 
specific individual’s video-watching behavior.  The classic 
example will always be a video clerk leaking an individual 
customer’s video rental history.  Every step away from that 
                                                 
177 Pursuant to the First Circuit’s reasoning in Yershov, if 
technology were to develop permitting an ordinary person to 
type an IP address into a search engine and reveal the identity 
of the person whose computer was associated with that 
IP address, the same facts alleged here might well result in a 
different outcome than the one we reach today.   
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1988 paradigm will make it harder for a plaintiff to make out 
a successful claim.  Some disclosures predicated on new 
technology, such as the dissemination of precise GPS 
coordinates or customer ID numbers, may suffice.  But 
others—including the kinds of disclosures described by the 
plaintiffs here—are simply too far afield from the 
circumstances that motivated the Act’s passage to trigger 
liability. 
 Our decision necessarily leaves some unanswered 
questions about what kinds of disclosures violate the Video 
Privacy Protection Act.  Such uncertainty is ultimately a 
consequence of our common-law system of adjudication and 
the rapid evolution of contemporary technology.  In the 
meantime, companies in the business of streaming digital 
video are well advised to think carefully about customer 
notice and consent.  Whether other kinds of disclosure will 
trigger liability under the Act is another question for another 
day. 
B. Intrusion upon Seclusion  
 Lastly, we turn to the plaintiffs’ claim that Viacom and 
Google unlawfully invaded their privacy.  In New Jersey, 
invasion of privacy is an umbrella category that includes a 
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number of distinct torts.178  The plaintiffs assert that the 
defendants committed the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, a 
type of invasion of privacy involving encroachment on a 
person’s reasonable expectations of solitude.  They rest this 
claim on the allegation that the Nickelodeon website included 
a message that read:  “HEY GROWN-UPS:  We don’t collect 
ANY personal information about your kids.  Which means we 
couldn’t share it even if we wanted to!”179  This message 
appeared on the webpage that children used to register for 
website accounts, apparently to calm parental fears over the 
tracking of their children’s online activities.  In light of this 
message, the plaintiffs assert that Viacom collected personal 
information about children, and permitted Google to do the 
same, despite its assurances that it would not collect “ANY 
personal information” at all.  
1. The Plaintiffs’ Intrusion Claim Is 
Not Preempted   
 We begin with a threshold issue.  Viacom argues that 
the plaintiffs’ intrusion claim is preempted by COPPA, which 
bars state governments from “impos[ing] any liability for 
commercial activities” in a way that is “inconsistent with 
                                                 
178 See Rumbauskas v. Cantor, 649 A.2d 853, 856 
(N.J. 1994) (explaining that invasion of privacy “is not one 
tort, but a complex of four . . . tied together by the common 
name, but otherwise hav[ing] almost nothing in common 
except that each represents an interference with the right of 
the plaintiff ‘to be let alone’” (quoting William L. Prosser, 
The Law of Torts § 112 (3d ed. 1964)).  
179 Second Compl. ¶ 103.   
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[COPPA’s] treatment of those activities.”180  As we discussed 
previously, COPPA directs the Federal Trade Commission to 
issue rules regarding the “collection, use, or disclosure of 
personal information from children” online, including rules 
governing parental notice and consent.181  Since the 
Commission only recently updated its definition of “personal 
information” to include the kinds of static digital identifiers 
(such as IP addresses) that underlie the plaintiffs’ allegations, 
Viacom asserts that the plaintiffs’ intrusion claim is 
“inconsistent” with the treatment of such information under 
COPPA.182 
 In making this argument, Viacom faces an uphill 
battle.  This is because we apply a general presumption 
against preemption, meaning that, “[i]n areas of traditional 
state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not 
supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an 
intention ‘clear and manifest.’”183  This presumption “is 
relevant even when there is an express pre-emption 
clause . . . because when the text of a pre-emption clause is 
susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts 
                                                 
180 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d). 
181 Id. § 6502(b)(1)(A).   
182 See Viacom Br. at 38 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d)).    
183 MD Mall Assocs., LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., 715 F.3d 
479, 489 (3d Cir. 2013), as amended (May 30, 2013) (quoting 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). 
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ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.”184  
The Supreme Court has also made clear that, even when 
federal laws have preemptive effect in some contexts, states 
generally retain their right “to provide a traditional damages 
remedy for violations of common-law duties when those 
duties parallel federal requirements.”185   
 The question we confront, therefore, is whether the 
plaintiffs’ intrusion claim is truly “inconsistent” with the 
obligations imposed by COPPA, or whether the plaintiffs’ 
intrusion claim rests on common-law duties that are 
compatible with those obligations.  Because we reach the 
latter conclusion, Viacom’s preemption argument is 
unavailing.   
 In our view, the wrong at the heart of the plaintiffs’ 
intrusion claim is not that Viacom and Google collected 
children’s personal information, or even that they disclosed it.  
Rather, it is that Viacom created an expectation of privacy on 
its websites and then obtained the plaintiffs’ personal 
information under false pretenses.  Understood this way, there 
is no conflict between the plaintiffs’ intrusion claim and 
COPPA.  While COPPA certainly regulates whether personal 
information can be collected from children in the first 
                                                 
184 Id. (quoting Franks Inv. Co. LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
593 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 2010) (additional internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
185 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996); see 
also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) 
(continuing to recognize that “parallel” state-law claims may 
be permissible even in the context of express preemption). 
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instance, it says nothing about whether such information can 
be collected using deceitful tactics.  Applying the presumption 
against preemption, we conclude that COPPA leaves the 
states free to police this kind of deceptive conduct.186 
 Indeed, we confronted a similar allegation last year in 
Google.  The plaintiffs there alleged that Google had evaded 
browser-based cookie blockers even as “it held itself out as 
respecting” them.187  We concluded that the alleged gap 
between Google’s public-facing comments and its actual 
behavior was problematic enough for a jury to conclude that 
Google committed “an egregious breach of social norms.”188  
In our view, the problem was not disclosure per se.  Rather, 
“[w]hat [was] notable . . . [was] how Google accomplished its 
tracking”—i.e., through “deceit and disregard . . . [that] 
                                                 
186 One might argue that if the kinds of static digital 
identifiers at issue here do not count as personally identifiable 
information under the Video Privacy Protection Act, they 
cannot count as “personal information” of the sort that 
Viacom promised not to collect.  We disagree.  First, the 
phrase “personally identifiable information” in the Act is a 
term of art properly understood in its legislative and historical 
context.  Second, the meaning of Viacom’s promise to 
parents—“We don’t collect ANY personal information about 
your kids”—is better left to a reasonable factfinder who can 
interpret that guarantee just as any other layperson browsing 
the Nickelodeon website might do so. 
187 Google, 806 F.3d. at 151. 
188 Id. (quoting the Google plaintiffs’ complaint) 
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raise[d] different issues than tracking or disclosure alone.”189  
In those circumstances, “a reasonable factfinder could indeed 
deem Google’s conduct highly offensive or an egregious 
breach of social norms.”190  We think the same is true here.191 
 Accordingly, we conclude that COPPA does not 
preempt the plaintiffs’ state-law claim for intrusion upon 
seclusion.   
2. The Plaintiffs Have Adequately 
Alleged an Intrusion Claim  
 The next question is whether the plaintiffs have 
adequately alleged the elements of an intrusion claim.  The 
                                                 
189 Id. at 150 (emphasis in original). 
190 Id. at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
191 While consideration of what a reasonable jury might 
conclude is normally appropriate at the summary judgment 
stage, we think it is also appropriate here given the nature of 
the common law tort at issue.  In Google, for example, we 
considered the plaintiffs’ allegations from the perspective of a 
reasonable factfinder because, under California law, privacy 
torts involve mixed questions of law and fact.  See id. at 150 
n.119.  New Jersey law appears to be similar.  Cf. Castro v. 
NYT Television, 895 A.2d 1173, 1177–78 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2006) (noting that “a trier of fact could find that the 
videotaping of some patients at Jersey Shore would not 
support imposition of liability for invasion of privacy,” but 
could also find that “[the defendant’s] videotaping of other 
patients satisfied all the elements of this cause of action”).   
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New Jersey Supreme Court, looking to the Second 
Restatement of Torts, has said that intrusion upon seclusion 
occurs whenever a plaintiff can show (i) an intentional 
intrusion (ii) upon the seclusion of another that is (iii) highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.192  At least with respect to 
Viacom, we conclude that the plaintiffs have adequately 
alleged each of these three elements.   
 First, the plaintiffs have successfully alleged an 
“intentional intrusion.”  We considered this issue in 
O’Donnell v. United States,193 where we stated that “an actor 
commits an intentional intrusion only if he believes, or is 
substantially certain, that he lacks the necessary legal or 
personal permission to commit the intrusive act.”194  The 
defendants contend that O’Donnell bars the present claim 
because, after all, they installed cookies on the plaintiffs’ 
                                                 
192 Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 
17 (N.J. 1992) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B 
(1977)). 
193 891 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1989).   
194 Id. at 1083 (emphasis in original).  While O’Donnell 
arose under Pennsylvania rather than New Jersey law, we 
concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was likely to 
adopt the definition of intrusion upon seclusion included in 
the Second Restatement of Torts.  See id. at 1082 n.1.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court later did so in Burger v. Blair 
Medical Associates, 964 A.2d 374, 379 & n.5 (Pa. 2004).  
Since the highest courts of both New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
have looked to the same treatise, we are comfortable adopting 
our reasoning in O’Donnell for present purposes.   
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computers under the belief that doing so was perfectly legal.  
While we appreciate the force of this argument, we do not 
think that the plaintiffs’ claim is so easily scuttled.  
 In the first place, O’Donnell is factually 
distinguishable.  That case involved the allegedly unlawful 
disclosure of medical records by the Veterans Administration.  
Discovery revealed that “O’Donnell had authorized the 
[Veterans Administration] on previous occasions to view 
these records and disclose them.”195  We therefore concluded 
that there was “no dispute of material fact concerning 
the . . . lack of any intention to invade the plaintiff’s right to 
seclusion and privacy.”196  The allegations here, by contrast, 
are devoid of any suggestion that the plaintiffs ever 
authorized Viacom and Google to collect or disclose their 
personal information.   
 Indeed, O’Donnell itself focused on whether the 
alleged intrusion occurred without “legal or personal 
permission.”197  Courts applying O’Donnell have 
appropriately treated the presence or absence of consent as a 
                                                 
195 O’Donnell, 891 F.2d at 1083. 
196 Id.  
197 Id. (emphasis added). 
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key factor in making this assessment.198  Whatever else the 
plaintiffs allege, they clearly assert that the defendants tracked 
their online behavior without their permission to do so.  We 
therefore conclude that, accepting their factual allegations as 
true, the plaintiffs have successfully stated the first element of 
an intrusion claim.  
 Second, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the 
defendants invaded their privacy.  We have embraced the 
Second Restatement’s view that liability for intrusion only 
arises “when [the defendant] has intruded into a private place, 
or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff 
has thrown about his person or affairs.”199  We think that a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that Viacom’s promise 
not to collect “ANY personal information” from children 
itself created an expectation of privacy with respect to 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., Gabriel v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 
550, 572 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (stating there was no intrusion 
claim where the personal information in question was 
“voluntarily provided” to the defendant); Muhammad v. 
United States, 884 F. Supp. 2d 306, 317 (E.D. Pa. 2012) 
(concluding that the plaintiff adequately alleged intrusion by 
federal agents who, among other actions, entered his home 
“without consent or a search warrant”); Jevic v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. of N.Y., No. 89-cv-4431 (NHP), 1990 WL 
109851, at *9 (D.N.J. June 6, 1990) (“[O]ne cannot intrude 
when one has permission.”). 
199 Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 260 (3d Cir. 
2004) (quoting Harris v. Easton Publ’g Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 
1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 652B cmt. c)). 
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browsing activity on the Nickelodeon website. 
 Third, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged, at least 
with respect to Viacom, that the intrusion on their privacy was 
“highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man.”200  The 
defendants disagree, contending that the use of cookies for 
benign commercial purposes has become so widely accepted a 
part of Internet commerce that it cannot possibly be 
considered “highly offensive.”  They also assert that the 
intrusion tort is more appropriately reserved for punishing 
behavior that is so offensive as to inspire out-and-out 
revulsion, as opposed to policing online business practices.201  
The District Court felt the same way, concluding that the 
plaintiffs never explained “how Defendants’ collection and 
monetization of online information would be offensive to the 
reasonable person, let alone exceedingly so.”202  
                                                 
200 Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 660 
(N.J. 2010) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B 
cmt. d). 
201 See, e.g., Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 969 A.2d 
1097, 1115–17 (N.J. 2009) (permitting an intrusion upon 
seclusion claim to proceed where a coworker falsely reported 
that a teacher was threatening to kill people, leading to 
hospitalization and physically invasive searches); Soliman v. 
Kushner Cos., Inc., 77 A.3d 1214, 1225–26 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2013) (permitting a claim to proceed where the 
defendant installed hidden video cameras in bathrooms). 
202 Nickelodeon I, 2014 WL 3012873, at *19; see also 
Nickelodeon II, 2015 WL 248334, at *5–6 (adhering to prior 
opinion). 
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 With respect to Google, we agree with the District 
Court.  As Google fairly points out, courts have long 
understood that tracking cookies can serve legitimate 
commercial purposes.203  The plaintiffs do not challenge the 
proposition that the use of “cookies on websites geared 
toward adults” is generally acceptable,204 instead falling back 
on the claim that the use of cookies to track children is 
particularly odious.  We are not so sure.  Google used third-
party cookies on Nick.com in the same way that it deploys 
cookies on myriad others websites.  Its decision to do so here 
does not strike us as sufficiently offensive, standing alone, to 
survive a motion to dismiss.205 
 As to Viacom, however, our conclusion is different.  In 
the same way that Viacom’s message to parents about not 
collecting children’s personal information may have created 
                                                 
203 See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. 
Supp. 2d 497, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“DoubleClick’s purpose 
has plainly not been to perpetuate torts on millions of Internet 
users, but to make money by providing a valued service to 
commercial Web sites.”).  
204 Pls. Reply Br. at 29.   
205 Accordingly, we agree with the view of our colleagues, 
previously expressed in a non-precedential opinion, that 
courts may decide the “‘highly offensive’ issue as a matter of 
law at the pleading stage when appropriate.”  Boring v. 
Google, Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(affirming dismissal of a lawsuit alleging that Google invaded 
the plaintiffs’ privacy when its “Street View” truck took 
photographs of the road outside their house).  
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an expectation of privacy on Viacom’s websites, it also may 
have encouraged parents to permit their children to browse 
those websites under false pretenses.  We recognize that some 
cases suggest that a violation of a technology company’s 
privacy-related terms of service is not offensive enough to 
make out a claim for invasion of privacy.206  Even so, our 
decision in Google compels us to reach a different result.  Just 
as Google concluded that a company may commit intrusion 
upon seclusion by collecting information using duplicitous 
tactics, we think that a reasonable jury could reach a similar 
conclusion with respect to Viacom. 
 We will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal 
of the intrusion upon seclusion claim with respect to Google.  
With respect to Viacom, however, we will vacate the District 
Court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings.    
IV. Conclusion  
 Several of the plaintiffs’ claims are no longer viable 
after Google.  These include their claims under the Wiretap 
Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the California 
Invasion of Privacy Act.  The plaintiffs’ claim under the New 
Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act is also unavailing.   
 The plaintiffs have also failed to state a claim under 
                                                 
206 See, e.g., Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-cv-3113 
(JSW), 2013 WL 1282980, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) 
(relying on California precedent to conclude that the 
disclosure of personal information in purported violation of 
music streaming company’s terms of service was not highly 
offensive). 
76 
 
the Video Privacy Protection Act.  Their claim against Google 
fails because the Act permits the plaintiffs to sue only entities 
that disclose protected information, not parties, such as 
Google, alleged to be mere recipients of it.  Their claim 
against Viacom fails because the definition of personally 
identifiable information in the Act does not extend to the kind 
of static digital identifiers allegedly disclosed by Viacom to 
Google.  
 Lastly, we will partially vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim for intrusion upon seclusion.  
Google teaches that such a claim may be strong enough to 
survive a motion to dismiss when a company promises to 
respect consumer privacy and then disregards its commitment.  
The plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Viacom collected 
personal information about children despite its promise not to 
do so, and we further believe that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Viacom’s conduct in breach of its promise was 
highly offensive under New Jersey law.   
 We will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal 
of all claims except the plaintiffs’ claim against Viacom for 
intrusion upon seclusion, which we will remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
